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OBSCENITY
OBSCENITY: A QUICK LOOK AT STANLEY v. GEORGIA
Prior to Mr. Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Stanley
v. Georgia,' the United States Supreme Court had consistently
ruled that obscenity was unprotected by the first amend-
ment's unconditional coverage of speech and press. 2 Stanley
enervates this dogma by stretching the first amendment be-
yond it's traditional proportions to insulate the individual's
right to possess obscenity.3
Federal and state agents entered Stanley's home armed
with a valid search warrant particularly describing certain
1 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
2 The leading case is Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
485 (1957) ("We hold that obscenity is not within the area
of constitutionally protected speech or press."). The exclu-
sion doctrine was reaffirmed in Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 641 (1968) ("[O]bscenity is not protected expression
and may be suppressed without a showing of the circum-
stances which lie behind the phrase 'clear and present dan-
ger' in its application to protected speech.") (Citation omit-
ted.). In addition to obscenity, the exclusion doctrine has
also been applied to "fighting words" [Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) ("Argument is unneces-
sary to demonstrate that the appellations 'damned rack-
eteer' and 'damned Fascist' are epithets likely to provoke
the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach
of the peace.").] and libelous utterances [Beauharnais v. Illi-
nois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) ("Libelous utterances not being
within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is
unnecessary, either for us or for the State courts, to consider
the issues behind the phrase 'clear and present danger.'").].
3 As applied to speech, the traditional purpose of the first
amendment is "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes de-
sired by the people." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1957) (Emphasis added.). Seemingly, the holding in
Stanley expands the purpose of the first amendment to
embrace the dignity of man purely in his capacity as an
individual. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE
FIRST AiEN NT 4 (1st ed. 1963).
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paraphernalia used in the bookmaking profession. The search
revealed three reels of obscene film. Stanley was arrested
for and subsequently convicted of "knowingly hav[ing] pos-
session of . . . obscene matter" in violation of Georgia law.4
Affirming,5 the Supreme Court of Georgia held that "it [was]
not essential to an indictment charging one with possession of
obscene matter that it be alleged that such possession was
'with intent to sell, expose or circulate'the same'."0 The United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the first and
fourteenth amendments prohibit making private possession
of obscenity a crime.7
The United States Supreme Court, in A Book Named
"John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
General of Massachusetts,8 held that ribaldry is vulnerable
to censorship if "(a) the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b)
the material is patently offensive because it affronts con-
temporary community standards relating to the description
4 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6301 (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1968),
which reads in relevant part:
Any person who shall ... knowingly have possession of
... any obscene matter.., shall, if such person has knowl-
edge or reasonably should know of the obscene nature of
such matter, be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be punished by confinement in the peniten-
tiary for not less than one year nor more than five years....
5 Stanley v. State, 224 Ga. 259, 161 S.E.2d 309 (1968), rev'd
sub nom. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
6 Id. at 261, 161 S.E.2d at 311.
7 394 U.S. at 568. Mr. Justice Black, citing his concurrence
in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959) and his
dissent in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476 (1966)
as examples of his position, concurred on his usual ground
that all anti-obscenity legislation violates the first amend-
ment. Relying on Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192,
196 (1927), Justices Stewart, Brennan and White concurred,
reasoning that the Stanley search violatated the particu-
larity requirement of the fourth amendment.8 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
278' [Vol. 6, No. 3
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OBSCENITY
or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is
utterly without redeeming social value."9 At present, the
Memoirs formula remains the prevailing definition of ob-
scenity.10 However, two recent decisions, Redrup v New York"
and Stanley v. Georgia,2 indicate that the Court is experi-
menting with a replacement for the traditional definitional
approach to obscenity analysis.
9 Id. at 418. Basically, the Memoirs formula combines the
Roth definition with subsequent decisions. In addition,
Memoirs clarified the question of whether the lack of
social value is an independent element of obscenity. See
Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 486 (1962)
(Obscene material must be both "patently offensive" and
appealing to a "prurient interest" before it can be constitu-
tionally prescribed.); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193
(1964) (The phrase "contemporary community standards"
implies a national rather than a local test.); Mishkin v.
New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509 (1966) (When material is
intended for a "clearly defined deviant sexual group," the
*prurient appeal element is measured by the standards of that
group.). The Memoirs formula was reiterated in Redrup
v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770-71 (1967).
10 Mr. Justice Stewart, however, subscribes to a more strin-
gent definition, i.e., "hard core pornography." Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463, 499 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
The most graphic definition of "hard core pornography"
was given by Judge Fuld in People v. Richmond County
News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 587, 175 N.E.2d 681, 686, 216 N.Y.S.
2d 369, 376 (1961) (Citation omitted.):
It [hard core pornography] focuses predominantly upon
what is sexually morbid, grossly perverse and bizarre,
without any artistic or scientific purpose or justification.
Recognizable 'by the insult it offers, invariably, to sex,
and to the human spirit' .. ., it is to be differentiated from
the bawdy and the ribald. Depicting dirt for dirt's sake,
the obscene is the vile, rather than the course, the blow
to sense, not merely to sensibilty. It smacks, at times, of
fantasy and unreality, of sexual perversion and sickness
and represents . . . 'a debauchery of the sexual faculty.'
11 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
12 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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The law of obscenity has matured in three barely visible
phases. In the initial phase, the question was whether the
challenged material satisfied the elements of obscenity, not
whether the speech in question jeopardized a valid community
interest. Under the baneful influence of Roth v. United
States,13 the Court utilized a definitional or per se methodol-
ogy to detect the presence of obscenity in noxious literature.14
While earlier decisions, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire"5 and
Beauharnais v. Illinois,16 concocted the egregious doctrine that
only ideas of social importance are eligible for first amend-
ment immunity, Roth applied this exclusion doctrine directly
to obscenity.17 The Roth Court concluded that obscenity is
utterly devoid of ideological content and therefore unquali-
fied for constitutional protection under the aberrant Chaplin-
sky-Beauharnais exclusion doctrine. This enabled the Court
to fashion a definitional approach to the problem of obscen-
13 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
14 Monaghan, Obscenity, 1966: The Marriage of Obscenity
I Per Se and Obscenity Per Quod, 76 YALE L.J. 127 1966).
15 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (Footnotes omitted.) (fighting
words) ("There are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene. . . . It has
been well observed that such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be de-
rived from them is clearly outweighed by the social in-
erest in order and morality.").
1' 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (libelous utterances).
17 354 U.S. at 484 (Footnote omitted.) ("All ideas having even
the slightest redeeming social importance -unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the pre-
vailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the
quaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon
the limited area of more important interests. But im-
plicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejec-
tion of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social im-
portance.").
[Vol. 6, No. 3
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ity rather than adopt the more conventional "clear and present
danger"'18 or balancing19 approach.
Ginzburg v. United States,20 Mishkin v. New York 2' and
Ginsberg v. New York22 introduced the second phase in the
evolution of obscenity law. Here, a new rubric emerged to
supplement the traditional per se methodology in cases where
social value vel non was marginal. The new approach -vari-
ously labeled "obscenity per quod,"23 "contextual obscenity"2 4
and "variable obscenity"25 - imputes a finding of obscenity to
nonobscene material if it is marketed in an obtrusive and
offensive manner.26 Under this approach, obscenity becomes
a variable, dependent on the book's content and the defend-
18 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The
question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to cre-
ate a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.").
See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927)
(Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring) (Added the require-
ment that the danger be "imminent."); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Overruling Whitney.).
19 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951), quoting,
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950),
affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (" 'In each case [courts] must
ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger.'").
20 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
21 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
22 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
23 Monaghan, supra note 14.
24 Semonche, Definitional and Contextual Obscenity: The Su-
preme Court's New and Disturbing Accommodation, 13
U.C.L.A. REv. 1173 (1966).
25 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The De-
veloping Constitutional Standards, 45 Mn=. L. REV. 5 (1960).
20 See Morreale, Obscenity: An Analysis and Statutory Pro-
posal, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 421.,
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.ant's conduct. Such aggressive marketing of pornography
is referred to as "pandering." Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking
for the Court in Ginzburg, defined pandering as "'the busi-
ness of purveying textual or graphic matter openly adver-
tised to appeal to the erotic interest of their customers'.127
Thus, in this phase, the Court did not strictly adhere to a
per se methodology, but also considered per quod factors as
relevent.
Redrup v. New York 28 introduces the third phase in the
development of obscenity law. This phase deadens the in-
fluence of the Roth exclusion doctrine by extending limited
constitutional protection to material assumed to be obscene.
In Redrup, the Court, apparently disenchanted with defini-
tions, inflated the pandering theory to protect the com-
mercial transfer of obscenity. In a brief per curiam opinon,
the Court ruled that the traffic of erotica in public commerce
is protected by the first and fourteenth amendments in the
absence of "an assault upon individual privacy by publication
in a manner so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an
unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it."28 Redrup is
an important decision because it indicates that the presence
or absence of pandering, rather than a definitional finding
of obscenity, will control the issue of censorship.0 The
Court, in Redrup, treated an obscene book as nonobscene
' 383 U.S. at 467 (Footnote omitted.), quoting, Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 495-96 (1957) (Warren, C.J., concur-
ring). In Memoirs, the Court opined that "where the
purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually provocative
aspects of his publications, a court could accept his evalua-
tion at its face value." 383 U.S. at 420.
28 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
29 Id. at 769.
30 But see Milky Way Prods., Inc. v. Leary, 305 F. Supp.
288, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd per curiam, sub nom. New
York Feed Co. v. Leary, 397 U.S. 98 (1970), where a lower
federal court held that pandering is not to be considered
as a fourth element in the Memoirs formula.
[Vol. 6, No, 3
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because of the absence of pandering, while the Court in
Ginzburg, Mishkin and Ginsberg treated a nonobscene book
as obscene because of the presence of pandering. In other
words, Redrup, by creating a conditional privilege to sell
obscene publications, enervates the Roth exclusion doctrine.
Stanley continues the trend established in Redrup.
In Stanley, the State, citing Roth, argued that, since
obscenity is not within the area of constituionally protected
speech or press because of its paltry characteristics, the states
are free to deal with the subject in any way they deem nec-
essary.81 Rejecting this contention, the Court ruled that Roth
and its progeny were not dispositive of the Stanley case.
Stanley was not asserting the right to profit from the sale
or distribution of obscenity, as in previous obscenity cases,3 2
but "the right to read or observe what he pleases-the right
to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy
of his own home."3 3 The Court reasoned that the right to
receive information,3 4 buttressed by a peripherial right to
privacy,85 erased any similarity between Roth and Stanley.
31 394 U.S. at 565.
32 Id. at 561 nn.5 & 6.
83 Id. at 565.
34 The right to receive information was drawn directly from
the first amendment as interpreted in Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); accord, Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) ("[T]he State may
not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment,
contract the spectrum of available knowledge."). See also
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
507, 510 (1948) (The right to receive information attaches
to information regardless of social value.).
35 Privacy was characterized by Stanley merely as an "added
dimension," intimating that privacy is not an independent
constitutional right. 394 U.S. at 564. But see Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-85 (1965) (Mr. Justice Douglas
seemed to imply a general right to privacy from five pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights: the first amendment pro-
tection.of the privacy of association [NAACP v. Alabama
19701
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The doctrine that obscenity is denied first amendment im-
munization was the product of cases involving public dis-
tribution of obscene matter; and, according to Stanley, this
rule is tolerated only because commercial dissemination pre-
sents the ubiquitous danger that "obscene material might
fall into the hands of children, . . . or that it might intrude
upon the sensibilities or privacy of the general public.130
However, the Stanley films were possessed for private en-
tertainment not for public exploitation. Thus, the possibility
that the mere private possession of obscenity will threaten
the morality of children or offend the sensibilities of an un-
willing general public is remote.
Stanley, like Redrup, avoided a definitional approach
by assuming the challenged speech to be obscene and reasoned
that obscenity "cannot, in every context, be insulated from
all constitutional protections. 3 7 This statement, despite the
Court's protestations to the contrary,3 8 inundates the Roth
exclusion doctrine which unequivocally requires suppression
once the material is branded obscene. This holding allowed
the Court for the first time to examine the social justifications
behind the censorship of obscenity.89
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).]; the third amend-
ment prohibition against quartering soldiers; the fourth
amendment prohibition against illegal searches and seizures;
the fifth amendment privilege against self--incrimination;
and the ninth amendment protection of unenumerated
rights.); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[T]he right to be left alone [is]
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men.").
30 394 U.S. at 567 (Citations and footnote ommitted.).
3 Id. at 563.
38 Id. at 568 ("Roth and the cases following that decision are
not impaired by today's holding.").
-9 Comment, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YAL, L.J. 1364,
1403 (1966). Roth and Stanley are possibly inconsistent for
an additional reason. Roth, discounting the Redrup decision,
proscribes the sale of obscenity, while Stanley acknowl-
[Vol. 6, No. 3
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Georgia advanced, and the Court scotched, three tradi-
tional arguments in support of sweeping anti-obscenity legis-
lation ° First, Georgia asserted the power to maintain the
moral purity of the community from the corrupting influence
of mildly salacious literature, independent of whether it
stimulates immoral behavior.41 The Court responded to this
contention by asserting that a person's private thoughts are
not the licit subject matter for regulatory legislation.
Whatever the power of the state to control public
dissemination- of ideas inimical to the public mor-
ality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on
the disirability of controlling a person's p r iv a t e
thoughts.
42
This statement and other references43 to the privacy of one's
thought process raise an interesting proposition. If the privacy
edges the individual's right to possess obscenity. If the
right to possess obscenity can be construed to include the
right to receive obscenity, it would seem to follow that
statutes proscribing the sale of obscenity would indirectly
burden the right to receive information and therefore be
unconstitutional.
40 See generally Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law
of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REv. 295,
373-387; Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity,
1960 Sup. CT. REv. 1; Henkin, Morals and the Constitution:
The Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLum. L. REV. 391 (1963);
Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amend-
ment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 937 (1963); Slough & McAnany,
Obscenity and Constitutional Freedom, 8 ST. Louis U.L.J.
279 (1964); Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth,
1966 Sup. CT. REV. 7.
41 394 U.S. at 565.
42 Id. at 566.
43 "We are not certain that this argument amounts to any-
thing more than the assertion that the State has the right
to control the moral content of a person's thoughts." 394
U.S. at 565 (Footnote omitted.). "Our whole constitutional
heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the
power to control men's minds." Id.
19701
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aspect of Stanley is interpreted to attach not to some con-
stitutionally protected locus but to an individual's thoughts,
then seemingly legislation drafted around the concept of
"prurient appeal" must be abandoned as an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy.44
Next Georgia contended that there is some rational rela-
tion between anti-obscenity legislation and crime prevention,
admittedly a legitimate subject of state concern. 4u The Court
noted the paucity of empirical evidence supporting a con-
nection between the exposure to obscenity and subsequent
illegal conduct 46 and stated:
Given the present state of knowledge, the State may
no more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter
on the ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct
than it may prohibit possession of chemistry books on
the ground that they may lead to the manufacture of
homemade spirits.47
Finally, Georgia drolled that the prohibition of possession of
obscene material is an indispensable element in statutory
schemes prohibiting distribution.48 The Court tersely replied
that, "[b]ecause [the] right [to read] is so fundamental
to our scheme of individual liberty, its restriction may not
be justified by the need to ease the administration of other-
wise valid criminal laws. '49
Standing alone, Stanley does not leave the institution of
censorship in smoking ruin. Theoretically, two valid govern-
mental interests remain. First, the state may protect adoles-
44 Contra, State v. Reese, 222 So. 2d 732, 736 (Fla. 1969).
46 394 U.S. at 566.
-6 Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions
of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46
Mnvn. L. REV. 1009, 1032, 1034 (1962) is the leading critical
analysis of empirical studies on this subject.
47 394 U.S. at 567.
4s Id. at 567.
49 Id. at 568.
[Vol. 6, No. 3
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cents from erotica, since obscenity may reasonably be more
harmful to children because of their intellectual and emo-
tional immaturity.50 And, second, the state may protect un-
willing adults from the chagrin and revulsion that usually
accompanies exposure to obscenity.51 However, in the absence
of these two dangers, the power of a state to censor obscenity
is of questionable validity. In other words, the state may
regulate but not prohibit the flow of obscenity in the com-
munity.
Hopefully, Stanley indicates the Court is mustering the
courage it will take to lift the dead and heavy hand of Roth
from the first amendment. However, those who sincerely
mourn the possible demise of Roth should be reminded that
the real issue behind anti-obscenity legislation is not the social
importance of the speech in question but the proper relation-
ship between man and state. "The door barring federal and
state intrusion into this area cannot be left ajar; it must be
kept tightly closed and opened only the slightest crack nec-
essary to prevent encroachment upon more important inter-
ests."52 In the final analysis, the only effective censor is the
individual himself.
Van N. Eden
50 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
51 Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
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